[SECURITY] Ensure XSS-safe rich text rendering

Due to missing internal handling of provided RTE configuration, it
was possible to directly persist XSS in database fields. Unless full
blown backend RTE tag configuration is available, this patch still
allows persisting potentially malicious data - which is not reflected
in the backend user interface - but to be sanitized during frontend
rendering (see below).

Corresponding configuration directives (`removeTags`, `allowedAttribs`)
are now considered again. Besides that a new, but simplified sequential
HTML parser ensures that runaway node-boundaries are detected & denied.

To sanitize and purge XSS from markup during frontend rendering, new
custom HTML sanitizer has been introduced, based on `masterminds/html5`.
Both `DefaultBuilder` and `CommonVisitor` provide common configuration
which is in line with expected tags that are allowed in backend RTE.
Using a custom builder instance, it is possible to adjust for individual
demands - however, configuration possibilities cannot be modified using
TypoScript - basically since the existing syntax does not cover all
necessary scenarios.

Resolves: #94375
Related: #83027
Related: #94484
Releases: master, 11.3, 10.4, 9.5
Change-Id: I5f8de43faab57b00052614ad37bd10ea9e384dc0
Security-Bulletin: TYPO3-CORE-SA-2021-013
Security-References: CVE-2021-32768
Reviewed-on: https://review.typo3.org/c/Packages/TYPO3.CMS/+/70345


Tested-by: Oliver Hader <oliver.hader@typo3.org>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Hader <oliver.hader@typo3.org>